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It is our hope that those amendments will be as acceptable to Parliament as they have been to 
those whom we have consulted. 
Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Consolidation of Certain 
Enactments Relating to Shellfish Fisheries and Shellfish (1967) 
 
I  
Writing in the year that the statute was passed, Leo Chorley and Gerald Dworkin observed 
that the Law Commissions Act 1965 ‘may well prove a landmark in the history of English 
law’.1 As their cautious phrasing suggested, they had their doubts. Some of their concerns 
related to the failure to integrate the Law Commission into the machinery of government: 
there was, for instance, no intention to give the Commission’s proposals any special status in 
the parliamentary process, and the provision for the involvement of Parliamentary Counsel 
looked worryingly sketchy.2 Perhaps more damagingly, Chorley and Dworkin also pointed to 
what they saw as problems with the constitution of the Commission itself. All the Law Com-
missioners were to be lawyers, and the two authors echoed a point made by WT Wells (in the 
parliamentary debates) that years ‘in the higher reaches of the legal profession’ might not be 
the best way to learn where ‘the shoe pinches the foot of the ordinary man’.3 Chorley and 
Dworkin also both reported and shared in the widespread apprehension about the political 
leanings of the first Law Commissioners; their widely known sympathy with the Labour Par-
ty, it was feared, might lend the Commission’s proposals a political slant that would provoke 
parliamentary resistance.4 WT Wells, writing an ‘interim appraisal’ of the Law Commission 
as early as 1966, put the point more starkly: the Commissioners’ fixed terms of office were 
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due to expire around the time of the next General Election, and a future Conservative gov-
ernment might be ‘not only critical, but hostile’ in assessing the Commission’s performance.5 
The Law Commissioners, Wells pointed out, had a ‘general image … of being rather to the 
left of centre, and this fact could, conceivably, after 1970, operate to the detriment of the 
Commission and their work’.6 
A vivid illustration of how deeply these difficulties were felt by those involved is pro-
vided by a public lecture given by Lord Kilbrandon, the Chairman of the Scottish Law Com-
mission, in 1966.7 He began his lecture by acknowledging that the phrase ‘law reform’ sug-
gested change ‘after some immense popular outburst having radical, revolutionary or even 
Marxist characteristics. In fact we think of something like the constitutional changes of the 
years 1832, 1867 and 1918’.8 Kilbrandon was quick to distance both himself and (implicitly) 
his Commission from this conception of law reform; the Law Commission’s remit must be 
narrower, but he struggled to define it:  
 
[I]s there any dividing line which can be discerned between law reform and social 
legislation? In practice, the answer to this question must be in the affirmative, 
otherwise the Law Commissions would never have been set up. If all law is social 
legislation, then all law reform is social reform. You would not set up commis-
sions consisting exclusively of legally-qualified persons in order to investigate 
matters of that kind and to report thereon.9 
 
This tortured passage, full of self-doubt and circularity, set the scene for Kilbrandon’s at-
tempt to identify what, exactly, the Law Commissions should be looking at. He started with 
‘lawyers’ law’, but quickly found this ‘an expression which seems to be full of epigrammatic 
meaning when you hear it first, but the more you think about it the less attractive it be-
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comes’.10 He put forward his own version of ‘lawyers’ law’ as the law concerned with the 
transfer (as opposed to the establishment) of rights; but then, almost immediately, he under-
mined it by proposing that a no-fault compensation scheme for personal injury would be a 
matter of ‘lawyers’ law’.11 This was an extraordinary public crisis of confidence, purpose and 
identity to be experiencing at such an early stage. 
The English and Welsh Law Commission’s experience, however, seems to have been 
happier – or, at least, its crises less public. Its first Commissioners, led by Lord Scarman (the 
Commission’s first Chairman), were prolific and highly effective: all the reports produced 
during Scarman’s tenure were implemented.12 The first Commissioners also established 
methods and patterns of working that remain fundamental to the Commission’s role and iden-
tity today. How did they do it? This essay examines the Commission’s earliest publications – 
its programmes, annual reports, working papers and reports on individual legal topics – to 
identify and analyse some of its strategies. 
 
II  
In asking ourselves ‘how they did it’ some stress must be placed on ‘they’. It seems clear that 
that no one individual was the dominating or driving force. Indeed, it is quite striking that in 
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography’s entries on the only two early Law Commis-
sioners it includes, both biographers emphasise that their subjects suppressed or concealed 
their true views when working at the Law Commission.13 The implicit suggestion here that 
both Lord Scarman and LCB Gower recognised that they had roles to play, and adapted their 
activities accordingly, could be equally applied to other leading figures. Lord Gardiner, 
whose energetic advocacy of a permanent law reform body had put law reform on the politi-
cal agenda,14 and who was rumoured to have insisted on the creation of the Law Commission 
as a condition of accepting the Lord Chancellorship,15 characterised the Commission’s work 
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as ‘part of that process on which we are now engaged, the modernization of Britain’.16 To 
proclaim the Commission as an agent of modernisation was very much to align both the insti-
tution and its aims with a central theme of political discourse in 1960s Britain. The Labour 
Party had come to power in 1964 following an election campaign in which it had dwelt on the 
unrealised potential of the British economy and the urgent need to make more use of new 
technology. Once in power, the drive to modernise inspired a wealth of policies beyond in-
dustry including new road signage, postcodes and decimalisation.17 A Law Commission that 
said it was setting out to modernise the law was, therefore, very astutely positioning itself in 
the prevailing political landscape. 
It was also possible for the Commission to draw on two related, dominant political 
values: professionalism and planning. An appeal to professionalism had been an important 
aspect of the argument for creating a Law Commission in the first place, with Lord Gardiner 
making much of the limited achievements of the Commission’s part-time predecessors;18 it 
remained central to the Commission’s identity.19 Professionalism was a particularly powerful 
concept to invoke at that time as it was one of the factors that the Labour Party had used to 
differentiate itself from the Conservatives, and was something which the Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, took great personal pride in.20 The full-time nature of a Law Commissioner’s 
role, and the Commission’s practice of submitting annual reports were reflections of profes-
sionalism, as also, perhaps, was the Commission’s over-ambitious First Programme of Re-
form21 (Wilson was notorious for his conflation of professionalism and overwork).22 
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ate future’. 
The importance of planning in government policies of the period was embodied in the 
creation of a new government ministry, the Department of Economic Affairs, which was de-
signed to formulate strategic economic policy.23 The Department’s main role proved to be the 
creation of a National Plan for economic growth, which would achieve a 25 per cent increase 
in output by 1970. As it turned out, the government had been wildly optimistic about its abil-
ity to control the economic conditions that would have made such extraordinary growth pos-
sible, but, in 1965, planning was still seen as the route to modernisation. The centrality of 
planning can be seen immediately in the Law Commission’s first published document, its 
First Programme.24 By identifying the areas that it proposed to examine, the Commission 
was obviously engaging in making a plan; but how it explained the choice of those topics, 
and how it proposed that they should be examined, revealed a different dimension of the 
Commission’s strategy. Right at the outset there was an emphasis on ‘practical considera-
tions’: ‘we have excluded those projects on which we cannot hope to make an immediate 
start’.25 There was also, equally prominently, an insistence on co-ordination between the 
Commission and other agencies: alongside the exclusion of projects on which an immediate 
start could not be made, the Commission stated that for the ‘avoidance of duplication of ef-
fort’ it had excluded matters already under consideration by other agencies, and that it pro-
posed to give active consideration to studies by other reform bodies that had not yet been im-
plemented.26 The Law Commission had instantly adopted the mentality and language of an 
efficiency-driven public body – the ‘immediate start’ implicitly promised prompt conclu-
sions27 – but it was not seeking to dominate. The themes of collaboration and co-ordination 
were carried through in the individual programme items: for instance, item II, on contractual 
exemption clauses in general, explained that it was building on the work of an earlier com-
mittee, and proposed dividing up the new investigation between an interdepartmental com-
mittee and the Commission.28 Item V proposed to revisit the vexed question of civil liability 
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for animals, which had been the subject of an unimplemented report in 1953.29 The pro-
gramme also called for the creation of new ad hoc committees – on jurisdiction and proce-
dure in personal injury litigation, on financial limits on magistrates’ orders in domestic and 
affiliation proceedings, and on the Judicature Act in its application to Northern Ireland.30 
What this approach suggested, in addition to the importance of planning, was that the Com-
mission was being very careful about relying on its own status and authority in bringing 
about legal change. 
 
III  
The anxieties about authority implicit in the Law Commission’s First Programme were made 
explicit in the Commissioners’ later unofficial writings. Both LCB Gower and Norman 
Marsh explained that ‘as a new and untried body’ the Commission had not felt able to do bat-
tle with vested professional interests by pushing for widespread procedural reforms.31 
Marsh’s essay also contained a very eloquent passage explaining why judicial development 
of the common law was no longer adequate: 
 
[I]t is no longer possible for the judge in modern English society to make those bold 
assumptions about family life and about relations between landlord and tenant, em-
ployer and employee, citizen and State which underlie many reforms of a seemingly 
legal character. On the one hand, he lives in an era where many value assumptions are 
being challenged; on the other he does not enjoy quite the unquestioned privilege, the 
charismatic authority, enjoyed by his Victorian forebearers.32 
 
A footnote to this passage identified the dethronement of the father-figure as one of several 
reasons for this development. What is particularly striking about Marsh’s comments, for our 
purposes, is that they apply equally forcefully to attempts at law reform by four late-middle 
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aged lawyers led by a judge. What moral authority, what credibility could such figures lay 
claim to? It is one of the most remarkable features of the early Law Commission publications 
that they hardly ever make such claims. 
In the first 20 publications, only once, in its report on civil liability for animals, does 
the Commission unapologetically rely on its own judgement about social conditions mandat-
ing legal change.33 More characteristic is the report on imputed criminal intent, where the 
Commission’s discomfort in having to advance its own test (consultees having disagreed) is 
palpable.34 The Commission’s preferred approach, however, was to either play down or min-
imise its own agency, and to depict the true impetus for change as emanating from elsewhere. 
‘Elsewhere’ might be taken literally – the working paper on administrative law, for 
instance, cast envious glances towards France, and suggested that we needed to be keeping up 
with the neighbours35 – but even representations from a single solicitor could trigger an in-
vestigation.36 More significantly, the Commission might seek to arrogate an external body’s 
authority when taking up that body’s reform proposal. In its report Proceedings against Es-
tates, the Commission supported a proposal from the Law Society to abolish a special limita-
tion rule that applied only in respect of such proceedings.37 The Commission reported the 
Law Society’s view that the existing rule was failing to achieve its intended policy purpose, 
and added that ‘solicitors are more likely to be familiar with the practical consequences and 
those whom we consulted did not believe that the abolition of the rule would cause serious 
delay’.38 This was, of course, technically the Law Commission’s proposal; but the Law 
Commission was presenting itself as little more than an obliging intermediary. 
The Commission’s publications on the reform of root of title to freehold land provide 
a particularly vivid illustration of its enthusiasm for depicting itself as a messenger.39 Both 
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the working paper (the Commission’s first) and the report proposed that vendors of freehold 
land should only need to prove that they had good title that could be traced back for a mini-
mum of 15 years (the requirement at the time was 30 years), but the working paper was quick 
to acknowledge that any such reform must have the support of conveyancers: ‘it would … be 
realistic to propose a reduction only if it would be acceptable generally to the public and to 
those in the legal profession on whom the public normally rely for guidance in land pur-
chase’.40 The Commission went out of its way to trail this implied invitation to the convey-
ancing profession by publishing the paper in the New Law Journal, and the confident reitera-
tion of the 15-year proposal in its subsequent report showed that the Commission had re-
ceived the responses it had hoped for.41 The report went even further than the working paper 
in its extravagant deference to conveyancers – ‘we appreciate’ the Commission gushed, ‘that, 
on a question such as this, it is easier for experts to know the answer than to prove it’42 – and 
it also offered a much more elaborate, historical account of conveyancers as agents of legal 
change. In this account, the statutory reduction in root of title effected by the Vendor and 
Purchaser Act 1874 was partly attributable to the changing practices of conveyancers;43 in the 
same way, current conveyancing practice could be seen as ‘repeating the historical pattern 
whereby a move to reduce the period has been preceded by the voluntary adoption of a short-
er period’.44 The reform was presented as having an inevitability about it, and the Law Com-
mission as being little more than the amanuensis of a cyclical historical process. The last 
thing the Commission could have been accused of was acting on its own initiative. 
 
IV  
Invoking the external sources of reform proposals glossed over the Law Commission’s own 
limitations; but sometimes those limitations could not be avoided. In such circumstances the 
Commission went out of its way to signal that it fully appreciated where the line was. Thus, 
where its researches brought to light an indefensible disparity between the level of fines for 
selling lobsters carrying spawn and for selling crabs in the same condition, the Commission 
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proposed assimilating the penalties, but refused to be drawn on what the appropriate fine 
should be: ‘we do not think that Parliament would look to us for advice on the proper level of 
a fine’.45 An appreciation of its own limitations also seems to have motivated the Commis-
sion’s proposals to allocate certain law reform tasks to entities other than itself (as we saw in 
the First Programme),46 and was expressly given as its reason for entrusting the reform of 
administrative law to a Royal Commission or similar body.47 
These public demonstrations that the Commission was aware of the limitations of its 
role and functions may well have had the paradoxical general effect of increasing its standing 
– a confident understanding of the limits of one’s role might, after all, imply a confident un-
derstanding of the role itself. But in one particularly significant instance the Commission 
went further, and exploited its own self-proclaimed limitations to create a uniquely authorita-
tive and influential position for itself. This was its report Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: 
The Field of Choice,48 which was the Commission’s response to Putting Asunder, a report by 
a group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury.49 
The opening paragraphs of Reform of the Grounds of Divorce suggested an acute self-
consciousness. ‘It is not, of course, for us but for Parliament to settle such controversial social 
issues as the advisability of extending the present grounds of divorce’, said the Commis-
sion.50 ‘Our function … must be to assist the Legislature and the general public in consider-
ing these questions by pointing out the implications of various courses of action’.51 This ‘lim-
ited task’ had an apparently modest ambition:  
 
As lawyers we recognise that the improvement of the divorce law is too important 
a matter to be left to specialists, whether they be churchmen, sociologists or law-
yers. Nevertheless public discussion of the subject should be more constructive 
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and fruitful if it can be focussed on practical possibilities. We have therefore tried 
to restrict this Report to a consideration of what appears from a lawyer’s point of 
view to be practicable.52 
 
However, when the report turned to consider the proposals advanced by the Putting Asunder 
committee, the analytical and persuasive power of the practical lawyer’s perspective became 
apparent. The Putting Asunder report had called for the replacement of matrimonial offences 
as grounds of divorce with a sole ground of breakdown of marriage. So far as the principle 
was concerned, the Law Commission was quick to acknowledge its own incompetence to 
judge: ‘many of the arguments for and against the breakdown test’, it commented, ‘depend on 
judgments of personal and social morality. To these we can only draw attention; it is not for 
us to determine their validity’.53 But what the Law Commission emphatically did feel itself 
competent to evaluate was the adjudicatory mechanism proposed in Putting Asunder. This 
required positive proof of breakdown, to the satisfaction of the judge, in every case whether 
defended or not. In the Law Commission’s view, this made the proposals impractical: litiga-
tion would take longer and cost more.54 A more practical solution, the Commission suggest-
ed, would be ‘Breakdown without Inquest’, in which an investigation of the marriage would 
not be mandatory, and breakdown could be assumed on proof of a six-month separation.55 
The Commission portrayed itself as helpfully proposing alternative legal machinery to give 
effect to the same principle – of matrimonial breakdown as the ground of divorce – that Put-
ting Asunder had adopted. But the reality was that, in its application to ordinary litigants, this 
was an entirely different system: the paternalistic, invasive procedure required by Putting 
Asunder was being replaced by an approach in which the parties’ own feelings, desires and 
evaluations – in short, their autonomy – was determinative. The Commission’s sardonic ob-
servation that ‘The parties are likely to be better judges of the viability of their own marriage 
than a court can hope to be’ underlined its awareness that its proposals would shift the bal-
ance of power in divorce litigation away from (professional) judges, thereby giving the par-
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ties control.56 The Commission’s proposal formed the basis of subsequent reforms,57 and the 
strategy it employed in its report illustrated the advantages that could be gained by (paradoxi-
cally) emphasising its own limited expertise. For here professions of limited expertise served 
both as expressions of appropriate modesty, and, simultaneously, as peculiarly compelling 
demands to be listened to on the self-identified specialism. 
 
V  
The Law Commission’s response to Putting Asunder was a compelling illustration of the way 
that, by claiming to speak as lawyers, the Law Commission could fashion for itself a position 
of authority and influence in a debate with wide-ranging social and political dimensions. The 
Commission also had notable success, as we have seen in the previous section, when it de-
picted itself as speaking for lawyers – as, for instance, when it supported the Law Society’s 
proposal to amend the limitation period for claims against estates. In order to adopt this posi-
tion it had to be representative of the legal profession, and the way it did this was by using 
the fundamentally important process of consultation.  
Contemporaries had absolutely no doubt about the significance of consultation in the 
early Law Commission’s activities. Gower described it as ‘vital’,58 and Marsh went so far as 
suggesting that ‘the techniques of consultation which the Law Commissions have developed 
are at least as important as the actual reforms which they have proposed’.59 As the Commis-
sion explained in its First Annual Report, it envisaged an integral role for consultation as part 
of a structural process: the Commission first undertook research, which yielded a working 
paper, and this paper was then put out for consultation.60 In the First Annual Report this ac-
count of the Commission’s working methods was preceded by the caveat that ‘[f]rom the out-
set we have taken the view that it would be inexpedient to lay down hard and fast rules of 
procedure’.61 By the Third Annual Report the tone had changed: ‘Our role in law reform de-
mands research and then consultation’, it proclaimed. ‘The working paper marks the transi-
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tion from research to consultation’.62 This striking self-confidence about the demands of the 
Law Commission’s role had a certain irony, for the Third Annual Report highlighted that the 
attractive simplicity of the binary model under which the Commission worked up its ideas 
first, before bringing in external consultees later, was already starting to unravel. Thus, the 
project on personal injury damages had involved circulating a paper ‘to a limited number of 
experts’ which was then being developed into a working paper; the project on appurtenant 
rights to land had made use of ‘a consultative group of lawyers and surveyors with expert 
knowledge’, whose responses to preparatory studies would inform a forthcoming working 
paper; and the land registration project had also undertaken an extraordinarily wide consulta-
tion in advance of producing a working paper. 63 Clearly the Commission regarded consulta-
tion as fundamental. 
It is also clear that the Commission regarded consultation as having a substantive con-
tribution to make – it was never a case of simply going through the formal motions for the 
sake of appearances. The point is made negatively in the Proposals to Abolish Certain An-
cient Criminal Offences, where the obsolescence of the offences proposed for abolition led 
the Commission to explain that ‘their abolition, as now proposed, is more akin to statute law 
revision than to law reform. It is for this reason that the Commission has not thought it neces-
sary to consult the profession formally on the proposal’.64 In other words, it was only where 
consultation had something to add that it would be undertaken. 
What consultation did add varied across the range of projects. Sometimes its contribu-
tion could be modest yet subtle. A good example can be seen by comparing the Commis-
sion’s working paper on powers of the Court of Appeal to sit in private in legitimacy pro-
ceedings with its report on the same subject.65 The substantive proposals and arguments of 
principle advanced in support of those proposals were essentially the same in both docu-
ments. But the report gave a sense of being grounded in practicalities, which the working pa-
per lacked; for instance, it drew on judges’ impressions of the ‘acute and stultifying embar-
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rassment’ of parties who were required to give evidence about their sexual behaviour in open 
court, and proposed making use of the Bar Library to disseminate judgments on important 
points of principle that had been delivered in closed proceedings.66 Consultees’ approval 
might also be relied on as, in itself, an additional reason to proceed with a reform. As we saw 
earlier, as part of its strategy to minimise assertions of its own (fragile) authority, the Com-
mission attributed the initiative for its proposals to reform the rules on root of title to freehold 
land to the conveyancing profession; when conveyancers responded positively to the consul-
tation paper this was, in itself, a strong reason to implement the proposal.67 
Perhaps the most powerful illustrations of the centrality of consultation, however, 
could be seen where the consultation process changed the substantive content of reform pro-
posals. In its project on restrictive covenants, for instance, the Commission had initially pro-
posed abolishing the need to register such covenants affecting unregistered land on the Land 
Charges Register; it had also proposed allowing the legal member of the Lands Tribunal to 
adjudicate on the validity of restrictive covenants.68 Both proposals were abandoned follow-
ing consultation.69 More dramatically, the consultation process might persuade the Commis-
sion to abstain from intervention altogether, as occurred with its Interim Report on Distress 
for Rent.70 
It was not necessary to read beyond the second page of this report to find out what the 
Commission thought of a landlord’s right to seize his tenant’s goods to satisfy a demand for 
rent: distress was ‘a relic of feudalism’, and the self-help remedy ‘an obvious anachronism’.71 
Readers of these opening pages must have felt that they could see what was coming. But then 
the mood shifted, as the Commission recounted the results of its extensive consultations, 
which showed that ‘[t[here is no evidence that wrongful distress is at all widespread’; that 
there was ‘little indication’ of the threat of distraint being abused, and that ‘the practice of 
most landlords [was] to stay their hand’.72 Landlords, indeed, deserved more sympathetic 
treatment, said the report, since, unlike other creditors, they were forced to continue giving 
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credit until they could recover possession of the premises.73 What was needed, the Commis-
sion concluded, was a better system of remedies; but, pending that, and ‘in view of the state 
of opinion emerging’, the remedy of distress should be retained.74 Here, then, consultation 
had been determinative, and it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to register quite how 
powerful its effects had been. For, if ever a legal doctrine invited sweeping, ideologically-
inspired abolition by a left-leaning law reform agency, surely it was distress for rent. It need-
ed very little imagination to see this doctrine as dramatising, and furthering, the effects of un-
equal distribution of wealth, yet the Law Commission was making very clear that it was not 
partisan: it had its views, of course (which were expressed at the start of the report), but the 




If the Commission’s publications give ample illustrations of the importance and influence of 
consultations, they are perhaps less forthcoming in explaining its significance. Why was it, 
exactly, that the Commission had felt able to assert, in its Third Annual Report, that its ‘role 
… demands … consultation’?75 Some rationales can, perhaps, be inferred from the use of 
consultation in the Commission’s reports, but more explicit discussions can be found in lec-
tures given by the first Commissioners, particularly by the Commission’s first Chairman, 
Lord Scarman. Scarman gave a series of lectures in Canada in the autumn of 1967;76 in a 
chilling reminder of the limitations of in-flight entertainment of that era, he told one lecture 
audience that he had spent the journey pondering the ambiguities in the following sentence: 
‘That fellow Thomas, whenever he met his uncle in the street, he removed his hat’.77 He had 
also, evidently, been thinking about the Law Commission’s operations, and about the func-
tions of consultation. He told his audience in Manitoba that ‘consultation is vital’. ‘It means’, 
he explained:  
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[K]eeping in touch with the social realities around us, finding out what interested 
people want, finding out their criticisms and their views, going to the practising 
profession, seeing where the shoe pinches, seeing what’s wrong and how it can be 
put right.78 
 
‘Controversy disappears’, he added, ‘largely in the process of consultation’.79 In Western On-
tario, a rather more muted account of the benefits of consultation was offered: 
 
[P]rovided the Law Commission remains aware of its limitations as a specialist body 
it can make a valuable contribution to the resolution of social problems … through the 
processes of consultation and research, as a medium for the collection and assimila-
tion of information gleaned from other fields such as the social and economic scienc-
es.80 
 
Scarman was back in North America in 1971, when he put forward a rather different 
justification for consultation in the American Bar Association Journal: ‘The Law Commis-
sion sees the ultimate object of the elaborate process of consultation as assisting Parliament 
on matters often of great technical detail which can seldom be adequately investigated in the 
course of Parliamentary debate.’81 A year later, in the pages of the Anglo-American Law Re-
view, he offered his most elaborate account: 
 
I have already mentioned one of the advantages of open consultation: it enables 
the layman’s voice to be heard in the process of law reform and it ensures that the 
Commission’s first tentative proposals are subject to the criticism of those who 
know where the shoe pinches. But consultation offers other advantages. It helps 
to dispose of possible misconceptions regarding the possible effects of the Com-
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mission’s proposals and thus improves the chance of our recommendations, when 
finally put forward, being acceptable to a large section of the informed public. 
Further, it helps to stimulate interest in law reform. And last, but not the least of 
the advantages of open consultation: it helps the legislature in the field of law re-
form. The Law Commission is an advisory body and if it is to render effective as-
sistance to Parliament it must consult widely and set out in its final report the 
scope and nature of the consultation.82 
 
What is immediately striking about these passages is their shifting contents and emphases – 
Scarman did not have one simple, stable rationale in mind that underpinned the Commis-
sion’s commitment to consultation. In effect he describes a cluster of substantively and func-
tionally distinct techniques having in common only the formal procedures of consultation. To 
take the narrowest first: consultation as a method of casting light on technical details calls for 
the involvement of specialists, typically professionals but not necessarily lawyers, whose ex-
pertise gives them a heightened alertness to the likely consequences and side-effects of re-
forms. An illustration of this kind of consultation at work can be seen in Blood Tests and the 
Proof of Paternity in Civil Proceedings, where the Commission withdrew its earlier sugges-
tion that the law should permit a person to refuse a blood test on health grounds, because 
medical respondents to the working paper had said that blood tests posed no risk to health.83 
Crucially, what makes this kind of consultation valuable is that it is targeted at experts.  
Broader, more representative consultation had different merits. Scarman spoke of 
‘keeping in touch with the social realities’,84 just as the First Annual Report had claimed that 
‘whenever any proposed reform of the law originates from social or economic considerations 
or is likely to have social or economic consequences, it is imperative to consult with those 
qualified to speak for the social and economic interests concerned’.85 The Interim Report on 
Distress for Rent provided a model example here, having involved ‘Government Departments 
which have proprietary interests, housing authorities, professional bodies, and organizations 
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representing landlords on the one hand and tenants on the other’.86 For this kind of consulta-
tion to be valuable, it was essential to involve representatives of all those potentially affected 
by the reform. 
A third form of consultation practised by the Commission involved a hybrid of the 
two forms already discussed. This consultation of representative groups of specialists was 
particularly useful to the Commission in its dealings with lawyers. Two of the first Commis-
sioners expressed in print the view that the greatest obstacle to law reform was often lawyers 
themselves,87 and it is tempting to see the Commission’s strenuous efforts to involve the legal 
profession, to flatter it, to defer to it, and to publicise reform projects in the legal press as a 
way of managing an inherently conservative and potentially hostile group. Thus, when Gower 
wrote that ‘The main reason [for consultation] is that if all those who think they ought to be 
consulted have not had an opportunity of objecting, they will take umbrage when the report is 
presented and be sure to raise objections then’, we might suspect that he had primarily in 
mind lawyers, whom he described a couple of pages later as ‘react[ing] violently against 
changes in their professional organization and methods’.88 The pomposity, self-importance 
and pettiness that his description implied was hardly a compliment, and we can only specu-
late about how he endured consultative events like the ‘widely representative Seminar on 
Administrative Law, organised by All Souls College’ in December 1966.89 Connoisseurs of 
irony can enjoy the conjunction of ‘widely representative’ and All Souls College under the 
Wardenship of John Sparrow,90 and the event in many ways enacts the contradictory impulses 
underlying the Commission’s consultation exercises. For this seminar was ‘widely repre-
sentative’ only in the narrow sense of bringing together ‘a number of lawyers and administra-
tors’91 – no further information was given as to who had been invited, or why they were con-
sidered to be representative – and there is nothing to suggest that any section of the public 
affected by administrative law attended. Viewed as an exercise in ‘keeping in touch with so-
                                                 
86 Law Commission, LC 5, Landlord and Tenant: Interim Report on Distress for Rent (1966) para 8. 
87 Marsh, n 31 above, 264; Gower, n 27 above, 266. 
88 Gower, n 27 above, 262–63, 266. The sweeping nature of this judgement does not seem to be borne out by, 
for instance, the conveyancing profession’s response to the Commission’s proposals to halve the period for root 
of title (see above, text at nn 39–44). 
89 Law Commission, LC 20, Administrative Law (1969) para 2. 
90 J Lowe, The Warden: A Portrait of John Sparrow (London, HarperCollins, 1999) gives a sympathetic account 
of Sparrow. Stefan Collini’s review, ‘From Bar to Bar-room Floor’ Times Higher Education Supplement (18 
January 1999) gives an invaluable account of the book’s value and limitations. 
91 Law Commission, LC WP 13, Exploratory Working Paper on Administrative Law (1967) para 2.  
cial realities’ the exercise was a failure; but seen in terms of embracing those interest groups 
who were articulate, organised and powerful enough to derail future proposals, one could not 
fault its strategy. 
Finally, we might turn to consider why the Law Commission set such store by consul-
tation. Was it really, as Gower argued, little more than a strategy for drawing out the sting of 
opposition before the proposals reached a delicate stage? My sense is that there was more to 
it, and that the Law Commission regarded consultation as giving its proposals an authority 
and legitimacy that they would otherwise have lacked. One clue is in the form of words used 
by Leslie Scarman, that enthusiast for ambiguity, when he spoke of consultation being valua-
ble because ‘it helps the legislature in the field of law reform’.92 Helps it to do what? The ob-
vious answer is: to do what legislatures do – legislate. ‘The assistance will be ineffective’, he 
wrote, ‘unless on the face of the report the scope and nature of the consultation are clearly set 
out’.93 Again, we might ask why this should make a difference if the primary aim of consulta-
tion is to anticipate objections? The success of that more cynical strategy had to be judged by 
its results (the neutralisation of objections) not by the quality of the consultation. The answer 
must be that Scarman envisaged that Parliament should use the evidence of consultation as a 
reason to legislate. The Commission itself captured the potential symmetry between consulta-
tion and parliamentary decision-making in the sentence used as an epigraph to this chapter: 
‘It is our hope that those amendments will be as acceptable to Parliament as they have been to 




At exactly the same time that the Law Commission was being created, Michel Foucault was 
writing Les Mots et Les Choses, a work in which he explored, among many other issues, 
questions about the authority and authorship of texts. One commentator has paraphrased part 
of Foucault’s concerns in a way that is particularly suggestive for this chapter: it was, he said, 
‘the importance of always asking of a text, “Who is speaking? (who – from what historical 
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position, with what particular interests – is claiming the authority to be listened to?)”’95 As 
we have seen, trying to think about this question in respect of the texts created by the early 
Law Commission gives a peculiarly rich and complex answer, for the circumstances of the 
Commission – as a newly-created, unrepresentative, advisory body operating in a sphere al-
ready densely populated by well-established, organised, authoritative and articulate actors – 
drove it in search of strategies that would lend its operations and proposals persuasive power. 
The success of those proposals, and the longevity of the Commission itself, reflect the sophis-
tication, imagination and ingenuity of the strategies it chose. 
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